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We study a firm that makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores to offer remanufac-tured products, along with new products, in future periods. We introduce the monopoly environment
in two-period and multiperiod scenarios to identify thresholds in remanufacturing operations. Next, we focus
our attention on the duopoly environment where an independent operator (IO) may intercept cores of products
made by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to sell remanufactured products in future periods. We
characterize the production quantities associated with self-selection and explore the effect of various param-
eters in the Nash equilibrium. Among other results, we find that if remanufacturing is very profitable, the
original-equipment manufacturer may forgo some of the first-period margin by lowering the price and selling
additional units to increase the number of cores available for remanufacturing in future periods. Further, as the
threat of competition increases, the OEM is more likely to completely utilize all available cores, offering the
remanufactured products at a lower price.
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1. Introduction
Remanufacturing is a process in which used prod-
ucts are disassembled and its parts are repaired and
used in the production of new products. A successful
remanufacturing operation often adopts high-quality
standards. It allows offering products that enhance
brand equity and keep customers loyal. Often, the
company expands its market coverage by offering
remanufactured products at a low price, side by side
with the new products. The benefits of remanufactur-
ing are even greater when the remanufactured prod-
uct is indistinguishable from the new product. The
disposable camera is a good example of a product
where the firm benefits from the cost reduction, while
charging full price for the remanufactured product.
We analyze a model where the remanufactured and
the original products are indistinguishable to the cus-
tomer. We analyze two-period and multiperiod sce-
narios where the manufacturer only produces the new
product in the first period, but has the option of mak-
ing new and remanufactured products in subsequent
periods. Pricing decisions impact the dynamics across
periods in such cases. For example, if the price is high
in the first period, profits in the first period might
increase, but the number of reusable products avail-
able in the second period decreases, thereby reducing
second-period profit potential. However, if the price is
low in the first period, initial profits might decrease,
but the firm has an abundant supply of cores for
remanufacturing in future periods. First, we derive
the optimal quantities and prices, and characterize
the optimality conditions for a monopolist that offers
either both product types or just new products in this
market. Next, we consider a competitive setting where
a competitor may intercept the returning cores and
exercise the remanufacturing profit opportunity. This
resembles the case where local film-processing centers
intercept single-use cameras and remanufacture them
to sell under their brand. In this setting, we charac-
terize the strategic regions of operation. We provide
analytical insights for all cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the related literature. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the monopolistic setting. Section 4 analyzes the
impact of competition, and we conclude in §5.
2. Related Research
There is general agreement that remanufacturing is
environmentally efficient and profitable (Ferrer and
Whybark 2000, 2002; Guide 2000; Larson et al. 2000).
Ayres et al. (1997) evaluate the economics of reman-
ufacturing and point out some problematic issues
specific to remanufacturing that have a substan-
tial impact on profitability. Ferrer and Ayres (2000)
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analyze the macroeconomic impact of remanufac-
turing and confirm the intuition that it promotes
demand for labor and reduces the consumption of
raw materials.
Remanufactured products can play an important
role in increasing profits, resulting from reduced pro-
duction costs. McConocha and Speh (1991) argue that
remanufacturing creates important benefits: (1) sav-
ings in labor, materials, and energy costs, (2) shorter
production lead times, (3) balanced production lines,
(4) new market development opportunities, and
(5) a positive, socially concerned image. Even though
profitable and environmentally efficient in many
cases, remanufacturing presents great challenges for
research and practice. Many of the trade-offs require
interdisciplinary analysis. Guide et al. (2000) enumer-
ate several complicating characteristics in remanufac-
turing that relate to process uncertainty. These issues
include the timing and volume of product returns,
yield estimation, balancing demand with core returns,
and managing reverse logistics (Ferrer and Whybark
2001; Guide 1997, 2000; Kekre et al. 2003; Richter
and Sombrutzki 2000; Teunter et al. 2000; van der
Laan and Salomon 1999). Fleischmann et al. (1997)
review quantitative models. Corbett and Kleindorfer
(2001) introduce the special issue on manufacturing
and ecologistics in POM.
Our research extends the perspectives regarding
the production of durable and quasi-durable goods
with monopoly in the first period and remanufactur-
ing competition in subsequent periods. Discussions of
other secondary distribution/segmentation channels
are found in Purohit and Staelin (1994). They provide
different policies to increase the total manufacturer’s
profit in a two-period model that compares buyback
and lease schemes. In related research, Hendel and
Lizzeri (1999) propose a model where consumers have
heterogeneous valuations for quality so that used-
good markets play a locative role to address the
interference introduced by the first market on the
secondary market of a monopolist company. Heese
et al. (2005) determine a manufacturer’s incentive
mechanism to develop a smoothly functioning sec-
ondary market based on a buyback contract with
predetermined delivery. Other related two-period
models include Van Ackere and Reyniers (1993, 1995),
Levinthal and Purohit (1989), and Purohit (1992).
Ferrer (1996) modeled the profit of a monopolist
that has the opportunity to market remanufactured
and new products in a steady-state environment. The
firm offers a remanufactured and an all-new prod-
uct in a given market, maximizing profits with an
appropriate pricing scheme. The research shows three
profitable strategies, which depend on the operating
parameters: to make (1) both product types, (2) just
the new product, or (3) just the remanufactured prod-
uct. In the last alternative, the firm indicates that
the product is remanufactured, even though many
individual units might be new. Other research has
addressed the marketability of remanufactured prod-
ucts. Debo et al. (2005) extend the latter model to
an infinite-horizon setting and determine the prod-
uct technology a priori to maximize the profitability
of the market segmentation. Majumder and Groen-
evelt (2001) describe a two-period model where the
original-equipment manufacturer (OEM) may choose
to remanufacture or not in the second period. The
reverse logistics process is based on the “shell alloca-
tion mechanism” observed in the respective market.
Four of these mechanisms are considered: whether
each of the players (the OEM and the independent
operator) can or cannot use the cores that are not
utilized by the other company. They prove the exis-
tence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium as
the solution of the competitive environment in each
of the four allocation mechanisms studied.
Our research differs from the above three papers,
and in some cases extends them in the following
manner. As opposed to Ferrer (1996) and Debo et al.
(2005), our attention is focused on optimal equi-
librium solutions in the duopoly case. Our article
extends Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) in that we
also consider a multiperiod setting where the inde-
pendent operator (IO) competes in the second and
subsequent periods. In our core collection process,
neither company can use the cores that are not used
by its competitor (a situation similar to the third
shell allocation mechanism introduced by Majumder
and Groenevelt). Our demand function differs from
theirs because it ensures self-selection: Customers
show higher preference for OEM’s product than for
IO’s product, a behavior quantified in Lemma 1. Sec-
ondly, we extend the analysis to obtain closed-form
solutions for prices and quantities in the Nash equi-
librium and characterize the optimal solution region
that previously was numerically explored.
3. Monopoly:Making Remanufactured
andAll-New Products
We introduce a monopolist that makes new prod-
ucts in the first period and has the opportunity to
make new and remanufactured products in future
periods. We assume that customers cannot distin-
guish between the two products, allowing the firm
to charge the same price for both of them. We con-
sider three approaches to this question. We start with
a two-period deterministic model to keep the anal-
ysis simple and obtain sharper insights. Then, we
extend the analysis to multiperiod and infinite plan-
ning horizons.
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Notation. Variables, parameters, and demand func-
tion.
Q Size of the potential market, constant every
period.
pi j qi j Price charged p and quantity demanded q
for product j in period i. The subscripts are
i = 12 	 	 	, and j = N (new), R (remanu-
factured), or A (all OEM products made in
the period). Therefore, qiA = qiN + qiR. In the
first period, only the new product is made,
and j is omitted. The demand function is
assumed to be linearly decreasing in price.
c s Marginal cost to make a new product c and
cost savings per remanufactured product s.
The cost to make a remanufactured product
is c− s.
 Core collection yield, defined as the fraction
of new products made in period i that is
available for remanufacturing in period i+1.
Therefore, qiR ≤ qi−1A.
 Discount factor per period ≤ 1.
Two of these parameters, the remanufacturing sav-
ings s and the collection yield , characterize the
firm’s ability to perform key activities in the reman-
ufacturing process. The cost parameter c character-
izes the firm’s ability to manufacture the product.
We select the remanufacturing savings s as the key
parameter to define the strategy space in each sce-
nario that we analyze, because it seems to be the
parameter over which managers can have the greatest
impact through strategic management of the facility’s
resources.
3.1. Two-Period Monopoly Model
The manufacturer chooses the prices and quantities
that maximize profits. In the first period, only the
new product is offered. In the second period, the firm




p1− cq1+p2− cq2N + p2− c+ sq2R
subject to q1 ≥ q2R
Q− p2 ≥ q2R
Q− p2 = q2N + q2R
q1 =Q− p1	
This optimization leads to the following result.
Theorem 1. (Existence of a Remanufacturing
Threshold). There is a threshold savings value s∗ = 1−
Q − c/2 such that, if s < s∗, the manufacturer
makes both remanufactured and new products in the second








If s ≥ s∗, the new products are not made in the second
period, and the optimal prices are
p1 =





The optimal policy is continuous at the remanufacturing
threshold s∗.
Proof. See the appendix (available as an online
supplement at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/
ecompanion.html).
This theorem indicates when the monopolist makes
new products in the second period. This happens
whenever the remanufacturing savings is low relative
to the threshold value. Figure 1 illustrates the behav-
ior, showing how prices and profit change with the
cost savings parameter.
Corollary 1.1.
(i) The threshold savings level s∗ is decreasing in c, , ;
(ii) If all cores are collected, the threshold savings level is
zero (i.e.,  = 1→ s∗ = 0). Consequently, the new product
is not made in Period 2, and the prices are given by





This corollary implies that as the number of
cores available increases, there is less need to price-
discriminate across periods. Here is another result:
Corollary 1.2.
(i) In either period, prices are equal to or lower than if
the firm did not remanufacture.
(ii) In the second period, price is equal to or higher than
in the first period.
Figure 1 A Remanufacturing Monopolist Q= 1000, c= $350,
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Part (ii) is surprising because there are remanufac-
tured products in the second-period mix, yet price
is higher than in Period 1, when all products are
new. The rationale is that the monopolist is concerned
with building a customer base that buys the prod-
ucts in Period 1 and provides cores that are essential
for the low cost production in Period 2. The monopo-
list skims the market with the low cost that can only
occur in Period 2. It happens that production drops
in Period 2, particularly if no new products are made
then. Because the firm serves a smaller number of
customers, and these customers do not distinguish
remanufactured from new products, the monopolist
can afford to raise prices.
3.2. Monopoly Model with Multiperiod Horizon
Consider a planning horizon longer than two peri-
ods. The monopolist tries to maximize total profit by
choosing the prices and quantities in each of M peri-
ods, constrained by the number of cores available for






k−1pk− cqk N + pk− c+ sqk R
s.t. Q− pk−1≥ qkR k= 2 	 	 	 M
Q− pk ≥ qkR k= 2 	 	 	 M
qkN + qkR =Q− pk k= 2 	 	 	 M
q1 =Q− p1	
The first constraint indicates that, in any given
period, the number of remanufactured products is
limited by the number of cores collected from pre-
vious period sales. The solution in this optimization
depends on the relative values of parameters Q, c, s,
and . Different parameter values may cause a con-
straint to bind or not. The following result is consis-
tent with Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let the remanufacturing savings satisfy
s ≤ s∗ = 1−Q− c
2
	
Hence, if the planning horizon isM periods, it is optimal to
adopt a constant price policy in every period except the last.
Production of new products should be sufficient to replace
the cores that are lost at the end of the previous period, and
total production in periods 1 	 	 	 M−1 remains constant.
The prices and quantities are:
Period 1: p1 = 12 Q+c− s and q1 = 12 Q−c+ s;
Periods k= 2 	 	 	 M − 1: pk = 12 Q+ c− s, qkR =
1
2Q− c+ s and qkN = 12 1−Q− c+ s
Period M : pM = 12 Q+ c, qMR = 12Q− c+ s and
qMN = 12 1−Q− c+ s2.
Proof. See the appendix.
This theorem indicates that it is optimal to reman-
ufacture all cores collected, as long as the remanu-
facturing savings are smaller than the threshold 0<
s ≤ s∗. It also shows that the firm should adopt
higher prices in the last period, skimming the entire
consumer surplus. However, if s > s∗, the policy in
Theorem 2 cannot be applied because it would vio-
late one or more nonnegativity constraints. Instead,
the monopolist makes more new products in early
periods and more remanufactured products in later
periods. As the remanufacturing savings parameter
approaches c, the monopolist may offer only remanu-
factured products in the final periods of the planning
horizon.
We illustrate this theorem with the five-period
monopoly in Table 1. Each block corresponds to one
variable of the optimal policy in Periods 1 through 5.
Notice the policy in the column s = 1. In it, p1 = p2 =
p3 = p4 = 7	185 and p5 = 7	5. Also, q1R = 0, q2R =
q3R = q4R = q5R = 1	9705. Moreover, q1N = 2	815,
q2N = q3N = q4N = 0	8445, and q5N = 0	5295.
The theorem can only be used for s ≤ s∗; other-
wise, it violates the nonnegativity constraint for q5N .
However, we obtained numerically the optimal pol-
icy when s ∈ s∗ c, shown in italics. Notice that in
this range the remanufacturing savings is so great that
the firm has no incentive to produce new products
in the final period. Rather, the firm offers very low
prices in Periods 1–3 to increase the quantities avail-
able for remanufacturing in Periods 2–5. Towards the
end of the planning horizon, prices increase because
the manufacturer does not plan to make new products
in the final period. The larger is the remanufacturing
savings, the more the firm sacrifices profit in Period 1
for a greater reward in future periods.
3.3. Monopoly Model with Infinite Horizon
The infinite-horizon model is a good approximation
of long planning horizons, because of the exponen-
tially decreasing value of future earnings. In the
absence of any perturbation, such as the end of the
planning horizon, we force the use of the same pol-
icy in every period after the ramp-up in Period 1:
The monopolist makes just the new product in the
Period 1, and Period 2 is the first of an infinite stream
of identical periods. The profit generated by the iden-
tical periods is a discounted multiple of the profit in
Period 2. Hence, we can simplify the notation and say
that for any period i > 2, pi j = p2 j = p2, and qi j =





1−p2− cqN + p2− c+ sqR
subject to Q− p1≥ qR
Q− p2≥ qR
Ferrer and Swaminathan: Managing New and Remanufactured Products
Management Science 52(1), pp. 15–26, © 2006 INFORMS 19
Table 1 A Five-Period Remanufacturing Monopolist Q= 10, c= 5, = 09,  = 07, s∗ = 34014
Remanufacturing savings level 	s

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.4014 3.5 4 4.5 5
Prices each period 	p1 p2 p3 p4 p5

7.5 73425 7185 70275 687 67125 6555 64286 6 3975 6 240 6 0825 5 925
7.5 73425 7185 70275 687 67125 6555 64286 6 3975 6 240 6 0825 5 925
7.5 73425 7185 70275 687 67125 6555 64286 6 3975 6 240 6 0825 5 925
7.5 73425 7185 70275 687 67125 6555 64286 6 407 6 2977 6 1884 6 079
7.5 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 7 4849 7 4084 7 3319 7 2554
Total quantity each period
2.5 26575 2815 29725 313 32875 3445 35714 3 6025 3 760 3 9175 4075
2.5 26575 2815 29725 313 32875 3445 35714 3 6025 3 760 3 9175 4075
2.5 26575 2815 29725 313 32875 3445 35714 3 6025 3 760 3 9175 4075
2.5 26575 2815 29725 313 32875 3445 35714 3 593 3 7023 3 8116 3 921
2.5 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 2 5151 2 5916 2 6681 2 7446
Remanufactured quantity each period 	q1 R q2 R q3 R q4 R q5 R

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.75 18603 19705 20808 2191 23013 24115 25 2 522 2 632 2 7423 2 8525
1.75 18603 19705 20808 2191 23013 24115 25 2 522 2 632 2 7423 2 8525
1.75 18603 19705 20808 2191 23013 24115 25 2 522 2 632 2 7423 2 8525
1.75 18603 19705 20808 2191 23013 24115 25 2 5151 2 5916 2 6681 2 7446
New quantity each period 	q1 N  q2 N  q3 N  q4 N  q5 N 

2.5 26575 2815 29725 313 32875 3445 35714 3 6025 3 760 3 9175 40750
0.75 07973 08445 08918 0939 09863 10335 10714 1081 1128 11753 12225
0.75 07973 08445 08918 0939 09863 10335 10714 1081 1128 11752 12225
0.75 07973 08445 08918 0939 09863 10335 10714 1071 1070 10693 10684
0.75 06398 05295 04193 0309 01988 00885 0 0 0 0 0
Profit each period
6.25 62252 61508 60267 5853 56298 53570 51020 5 0345 4662 4241 3 7694
6.25 71553 81213 91479 10235 113830 125915 136054 13 861 15 190 16 581 18 032
6.25 71553 81213 91479 10235 113830 125915 136054 13 861 15 190 16 581 18 032
6.25 71553 81213 91479 10235 113830 125915 136054 13 8815 15 333 16 870 18 4936
6.25 71801 82205 93711 10632 120031 134845 147534 15 0526 16 608 18 228 19 9133
Total profit
25.594 28388 31352 34487 37792 41268 44915 47965 48 732 52 712 56 852 61151
qN + qR =Q− p2
q1 =Q− p1	
The Lagrangean is concave, leading to the following
result.
Theorem 3. If the product is offered for a large number
of periods, it is optimal to adopt the same price in the first
period as in the following periods. Moreover, production of
new products should be sufficient to replace the cores that
are lost in the process, such that total production remains







 qR=qA and qN = 1−qA	
Proof. See the appendix.
This theorem consolidates the results in the pre-
vious sections in a very intuitive manner. Because
the profit function does not incur fixed costs each
period—a reasonable assumption in a dedicated pro-
duction line—there is no incentive to store cores
beyond the current period. Once a core is collected, it
is remanufactured immediately or it is discarded.
4. Duopoly
Manufacturers of single-use cameras have been facing
an unusual type of competition. Large local labs have
instituted their own used-camera collection systems to
feed parallel remanufacturing processes. They insert
a new film in the camera, replace some critical parts,
place their own private label, and sell them in super-
markets and drugstores. Manufacturers of printer car-
tridges face a very similar experience. In this section,
we model this type of competition. In the first period,
the original-equipment manufacturer (OEM) sells the
new product. At the end of the first period, some units
return to the OEM, and an independent operator (IO)
intercepts the remainder. The OEMmakes q1 = Q−p1
Ferrer and Swaminathan: Managing New and Remanufactured Products
20 Management Science 52(1), pp. 15–26, © 2006 INFORMS
in Period 1, knowing that it will face competition in
the future. The IO responds with a lower price, know-
ing that, other things equal, customers prefer the OEM
brand. The following lemma identifies the demand as
a function of the prices of two vertically differentiated
products.
Lemma 1. Suppose that two competing products, high
H and low L, are offered in the market. Let the vari-
able z characterize the consumers according to their valu-
ation of the high product. Let  ∈ 01 indicate the cus-
tomer’s tolerance for the low product. Large values of 
indicate that customers accept the low product better than
if  is small. We describe the utility that a consumer of
type z enjoys when buying each product as UHz= z−pH
(high) or ULz = z − pL (low). Let there be Q poten-
tial consumers uniformly distributed from 0 to Q, accord-
ing to their valuation of the high product. If  ∈ pL/pH
1− pH − pL/Q, the number of consumers buying each
product type is:
qHpHpL=





If  < pL/pH , qL = 0 and qH = Q − pH . If  > 1 −
pH − pL/Q, qL =Q− pL/ and qH = 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Equations (1) and (2) are similar to the demand
functions in a Bertrand duopoly: For each player,
the demand increases when the competitor’s price
increases or when the player’s own price decreases.
However, Lemma 1 provides exact coefficients for
the Bertrand demand function, identifying how cus-
tomers select vertically differentiated products. Using
this result, we can express the quantities sold as func-
tions of the behavior-inducing prices. Let the OEM
face competition in period k. We extend the nota-
tion in the previous section using pk I and qk I as the
price and quantity sold by an independent operator
(IO). Because each firm would only consider prices
that would lead to nonnegative demand, we may
disregard prices that would lead to  
 pkA/pk I 
1 − pkA − pk I /Q]. Hence, based on Lemma 1, we
have:
qkApkA pk I =
1−Q− pkA+ pk I
1−  (3)
qk I pkA pk I =
pkA− pk I
1− 	 (4)
4.1. Two-Period Duopoly Model
Consider that the OEM makes only new products in
Period 1, but it may sell either new products, remanu-
factured products (constrained by product returns), or
both in Period 2. All units made by the IO are reman-
ufactured. The remanufacturing savings are sA for the
OEM and sI for the IO. Also, the OEM collects a frac-
tion  of all units made in Period 1, and the IO collects
the remainder. The OEM’s objective function is:
Max
p1 p2Aq2R
p1− cq1+p2A− cq2N + p2A− c+ sAq2R
subject to q1 ≥ q2R
q2A ≥ q2R
q2N + q2R = q2A
q1 =Q− p1	
If we replace q2A by its expression in (3), the
Lagrangean of the OEM’s objective function is














The Lagrangean is concave with respect to all three













= sA−A− A = 0







A ≥ 0 and  A ≥ 0	
We evaluate the IO response to the OEM actions. The
independent operator is constrained by its ability to
intercept cores that the OEM would collect otherwise.
Being rational, the IO attempts to maximize its profit,
subject to the number of cores intercepted, as follows:
Max
p2I
p2I − c+ sI q2I
subject to 1−q1 ≥ q2I 
q2I ≥ 0	
The first constraint restricts the number of cores that
the IO can remanufacture. Once we replace q2I by
its expression in (4), the Lagrangean of this objective
function becomes
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I ≥ 0 and  I ≥ 0	
These conditions lead to the theorem that describes
their optimal policies.
Theorem 4. (Characterization of the Competi-
tive Space). The OEM remanufactures all cores that it
collects. Moreover, seven linear relations between sA and sI
(see Table 2 and Figure 2) characterize the optimal policies
for the OEM and the IO:
A. If sA < "AB and sI < "AC, the OEM makes new prod-
ucts in Period 2, and the IO does not make any product.
B. If "AB < sA and sI < "BD+mBDsA, the OEM does not
make new products in Period 2, and the IO does not make
any product.
C. If "AC < sI <min"CE +mCEsA"CD +mCDsA, the
OEM makes new products in Period 2, and the IO reman-
ufactures some of the intercepted cores.
D. If max"BD + mBDsA"CD + mCDsA < sI < "DF +
mDFsA, the OEM does not make new products in Period 2,
and the IO remanufactures some of the intercepted cores.
































































































E. If "CE+mCEsA < sI and sA < "EF, both the OEM and
the IO remanufacture all cores that they collect, while the
OEM makes additional new products in Period 2.
F. If "EF < sA and "DF + mDFsA < sI , both the OEM
and the IO remanufacture all cores that they collect, and
no new product is made in Period 2.
Proof. See the appendix.
The savings parameters sA and sI define the six sce-
narios in the second period: (1) for low values of sA,
the OEM makes both products; (2) for high values
of sA, the OEM makes just the remanufactured prod-
uct. Moreover, (1) for low values of sI , the imitator
(IO) does not make any product; (2) for intermediate
values of sI , the IO remanufactures only part of the
intercepted cores, and the remainder is wasted; (3) for
high value of sI , the IO remanufactures all intercepted
cores. Here are two examples.
Case 1. Q = 1000, c = $200,  = 0	9,  = 0	75, and
 = 0	3. The manufacturing cost is low, customer’s
tolerance for private labels is high,  is low, and the
IO intercepts most of the cores, leaving only 30%
to the OEM. In this case, "AB and "EF are greater
than c and "AC < 0. Hence, only scenarios C and E
are present. Because "CE = 26 and mCE  0, the IO
remanufactures all intercepted cores when sI > $26.
On the other hand, the OEM is so short on cores that
it must build new products to meet demand in the
second period, regardless of its remanufacturing sav-
ings. This outcome fits the intuition nicely, because
the market accepts private labels well, and the IO cap-
tures most cores at the end of the first period.
Case 2. Q = 1000, c = $800,  = 0	3,  = 0	95, and
 = 0	5. Here, the manufacturing cost is high, cus-
tomer’s tolerance for private labels is very low,  is
high, and the OEM collects one-half of all cores. The
critical values are "AB = 570, "AC = 535, "BD = 518,
"CE = 558, "CD = 710, "DF = 548, and "EF = 421, imply-
ing that all scenarios are found in this case. The man-
ufacturing cost is very high, leading to high price and
low volume in the first period. Hence, scenarios A and
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B prevail most of the time, unless the IO has very high
remanufacturing savings.
Corollary 4.1.
(i) Shorter cycle time (which translates into higher )
leads to lower prices in both periods.
(ii) Lower manufacturing cost (lower c) or higher re-
manufacturing savings (higher sA and sI  reduce prices in
both periods.
(iii) Higher customer tolerance (high ) reduces OEM
price in Period 2.
Corollary 4.2.
(i) Higher fraction of cores returning to the OEM
(higher ) reduces the number of new products in the sec-
ond period.
(ii) Higher manufacturing costs (high c) reduce the
number of units remanufactured by the independent oper-
ator (IO) in the second period.
Notice that the OEM is a de facto monopolist in
scenarios A and B. As such, "AB and "EF play a role
similar to the critical value s∗ that we identified in §3.
Because there is a threat that an imitator might intro-
duce an alternative product in Period 2, the OEM
adapts. The threat, driven by the customer’s tolerance
for the alternative product, leads to s∗ <"AB. If = 0,
the threat disappears, and s∗ = "AB = "EF. However,
if sI or  is sufficiently high, the monopolist is less
likely to prevent competitive entry without hurting its
own profitability. This leads to Theorem 5:
Theorem 5. (Monopolist Behavior in the Pres-
ence of Competitive Threat).
(i) If sA ≤ s∗, the OEM charges the same price in
Period 1, under competitive threat or not. However, the
price in Period 2 is lower when there is competitive threat
than when there is not.
(ii) If s∗ < sA ≤ "AB, or if "AB < sA, and the OEM is
under competitive threat, the price is lower in both periods
than when there is no threat.
Proof. See the appendix.
4.2. Multiperiod Duopoly Model
Now, we consider a multiperiod planning horizon.
The OEM initializes the market making new products
in Period 1 and faces competition from an indepen-
dent operator in the periods that follow. We assume
that unused cores left at the end of the period do
not carry over to the next period. (The rationale is
that, because the remanufactured product costs less to
make, the firm has no incentive to delay the revenue








+ pkA− c+ sAqkR
subject to qk−1A+ qk−1 I ≥ qkR k= 3 	 	 	 M
qkA ≥ qkR k= 2 	 	 	 M
q1 ≥ q2R
qkN + qkR = qkA k= 2 	 	 	 M
q1 =Q− p1	
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qk I ≥ 0 k= 2 	 	 	 M
1−Q− p1≥ q2 I 	
There are several Nash equilibria defining the opti-
mal policies that maximize these firms’ profits. Each
equilibrium is the unique solution for a given set of
parameters, which we characterize in terms of the
remanufacturing savings pair sA, sI . If the planning
horizon has only three periods M = 3, the analysis
shows that the competitive space will look like Fig-
ure 3, where each region represents a type of equilib-
rium. Notice the similarity with Figure 2. Scenarios A,
C, and F have the same boundaries in both figures:
When parameters sA and sI fall in any of these areas,
the firms adopt the same policies in Periods 2 and 3
as they would do in the last period of a two-period
planning horizon. The same similarity exists between
scenarios B2, D1, and E1 of the three-period horizon
and scenarios B, D, and E of the two-period planning
horizon. However, there are differences:
• Scenarios B1, B3, and D2: The OEM makes new
products in the last period of the planning horizon,
but not in Period 2.
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• Scenarios B3 and B4: The IO remanufactures
some cores collected in the last period of the planning
horizon, but none in Period 2.
• Scenario E2: The IO remanufactures all cores col-
lected in Period 2, but only part of the cores in the
last period of the planning horizon.
If M > 3, (i.e., longer planning horizon) scenar-
ios B, D, and E have additional partitions to accom-
modate end-gaming strategies that are appropriate
with extreme values of sA and sI	. For example, if the
planning horizon is four periods, scenario E in the
two-period planning horizon is partitioned in three
scenarios: (1) IO remanufactures all cores in Periods 2,
3, and 4; (2) IO remanufactures all cores in Periods 2
and 3, but not all in Period 4; and (3) IO remanu-
factures all cores in Period 2, but not all in Period 3
and 4. The three scenarios give continuity to scenario
C in which the IO remanufactures only part of the
cores collected.
Scenario C is perhaps the most interesting because
it represents a quite realistic range of remanufactur-
ing savings for both companies. In this scenario, the
capacity constraints are nonbinding, leading to this
result applicable to any planning horizon:
Theorem 6. (Competitive Behavior in a Multi-
period Planning Horizon). If the firms have a mul-
tiperiod planning horizon, and their savings parameter sA
and sI satisfy the inequality "AC < sI <min"CE+mCEsA
"CD+mCDsA, (see Table 2) then we have:
(i) Both firms remanufacture in every period past
Period 1.
(ii) The OEM maintains a constant production volume
by making a sufficient number of new units to replace those
intercepted by the IO each period.
(iii) The OEM adopts a constant price policy in Peri-
ods 2 to M, remanufacturing all cores that it collects each
period.
(iv) The IO adopts a constant price policy in Periods 2
to M, remanufacturing only part of the cores intercepted
each period.
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1−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Proof. See the appendix.
This theorem is quite powerful for two reasons.
First, because both firms adopt a constant policy
regardless of the duration of the planning horizon,
it remains valid even if each firm plans its strategy
with a different horizon in mind. Even if the OEM
and the IO have different planning horizons, each
firm would independently select constant policies as
if they planned to leave the market at the same time.
Second, although the theorem does not address the
complete range of values of sA and sI , its range has
significant managerial interest, because each firm is
capable of significant (while still realistic) remanufac-
turing savings.
4.3. Duopoly Model with Infinite Horizon
If the planning horizon is very long, we can approx-
imate the problem with an infinite-horizon model as
we did in §3.3, because the value of future earnings
is exponentially decreasing. We model Period 1 as the
initialization period, followed by an infinite stream
of identical periods, when both firms adopt constant
policies. Also, both firms collect as many cores as pos-
sible, regardless of its origin. Hence, we simplify our
notation: if i > 2, pij = p2j = pj , and qij = q2j = qj . The





1−pA− cqN + pA− c+ sAqR
subject to qA+ qI ≥ qR
qA ≥ qR
q1 ≥ qR
qN + qR = qA
q1 =Q− p1	




1−pI − c+ sI qI
subject to 1−qA+ qI ≥ qI
1−q1 ≥ qI
qI ≥ 0	
The KKT conditions generate the system of equations
that leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 7. The OEM remanufactures all cores col-
lected in Period 2. Moreover, seven linear relations between
sA and sI characterize the optimal policies for the OEM
and the IO in an infinite planning horizon (see Table 3 and
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Figure 4), as follows:
R. If sI < "RU and sA < "RS, the OEM uses only some
of the cores collected in future periods, and the IO does not
participate.
S. If sI < "RU and "RS < sA, the OEM uses all cores
collected every period, and the IO does not participate.
T. If "RU < sI < "TW and sI < "TR +m1sA, the OEM
uses all cores collected every period, and the IO remanu-
factures only part of the cores collected every period.
U. If "RU < sI and "TR +m1sA < sI < "UV +m2sA, the
OEM uses only part of the cores collected in future periods,
and the IO remanufactures only part of the cores collected
every period.
V. If "UV +m2sA < sI and sA < "VW , both firms use all
cores collected in the second period, but only part of the
cores collected in future periods.














W. If "TW < sI and "VW < sA, both firms remanufacture
all cores in every period.
Proof. See the appendix.
The theorem characterizes each player’s strategy
based on one’s own remanufacturing savings, the
other firm’s savings, and the original manufacturing
cost. The OEM always remanufactures all the cores
that it collects from first-period sales. As Figure 4
suggests, the IO fully participates if its savings level
is high compared to that of the OEM. Likewise, the
OEM’s participation increases if the IO cannot gener-
ate significant remanufacturing savings. If the sA sI ,
the OEM might be alone in this market.
The IO usually remanufactures only part of the
cores that it collects (scenarios U and T) unless it
generates extremely high remanufacturing savings, or
customers have high tolerance for private labels, as
the following cases illustrate:
Case 3. Q= 1000, c = $200, = 0	8, = 0	925, and
 = 1/3. The manufacturing cost is low, customer’s
tolerance for generic brand is very high, and the
OEM collects one-third of all cores (the IO collects the
remainder). Consequently, the IO always participates
in this market ("RU < 0 and scenarios R and S vanish).
The OEM remanufactures all cores if the IO savings
are lower than 2	6sA − $408 (scenario T). Finally, if
the IO generates savings greater than 0	58sA + $47, it
remanufactures every core that it collects (scenario V).
Because "VW > c, scenario W also vanishes.
Case 4. Q= 1000, c= $400, = 0	30, = 0	925, and
 = 1/3. The manufacturing cost is high, customer’s
tolerance is very low, and the OEM collects one-
third of all cores. The IO does not participate in this
market unless it generates savings greater than half
of the original manufacturing costs "RU = 206. The
OEM remanufactures all cores that it collects when-
ever it generates savings greater than $26 and the IO
generates savings lower than 1	14sA − $177 (scenar-
ios S and T). If the IO generates savings greater than
0	63sA+$297, it remanufactures every core that it col-
lects (scenario V). Because "TW > c, scenario W van-
ishes again.
Notice that the two cases differ just on the cus-
tomers’ tolerance for generic brand and on the
marginal cost of the new product. Yet, while in the
first case the IO can profitably remanufacture most
or all cores that it intercepts, in the second case, the
IO has to generate very high savings in its remanu-
facturing process to have a chance to participate in
this market, despite intercepting 2/3 of all cores each
period.
5. Conclusions and Future Research
Many companies have organized their product line
based on remanufacturing capabilities, for example,
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manufacturers of printer cartridges, single-use cam-
eras, tires, hospital beds, medical equipment, mili-
tary equipment, and many other products. Often, they
operate in a monopoly or quasi-monopoly environ-
ment. However, competition may occur if an inde-
pendent operator intercepts some of the cores, which
is common in industries that have an abundant
return flow of recoverable cores. This paper ana-
lyzes the new and the remanufactured product in
the monopoly and duopoly scenarios, and identi-
fies insights that help managers of remanufacturing
operations to find effective policies for their product
lines.
For the original-equipment manufacturer, an over-
arching observation is that, as the marginal cost of
remanufacturing decreases, the value of making new
products in the first period increases, and the value
of making new products in future periods decreases.
In other words, if remanufacturing is very profitable,
the firm forgoes some of the first-period margin by
making additional units in the first period to increase
the number of cores available for remanufacturing
later. This behavior does not change, whether the OEM
is a monopolist or not, operating with any planning hori-
zon. We considered the assumption that an indepen-
dent operator (IO) has access to a fraction of the cores
at the end of each period. Considering the discount
that the market requires from generic brands, if the
remanufacturing savings is not sufficiently high, the
IO does not have any share of the market. The rea-
son is the following: Once the price of OEM is set,
the IO can only hope to attract customers that con-
sider the OEM’s price too high. However, to reach
those customers, the IO would have to set price below
marginal cost, which is not reasonable. As the savings
increase, the IO is able to reach some customers in the
market. Gradually, the savings may be so high that
the IO remanufactures all cores that it collects.
In addition to the two-period model, we also ana-
lyze multiperiod and infinite planning horizons. Both
models show that the optimal strategies obtained
from the two-period model are quite relevant in
longer planning horizons: The optimal policy in the
last period is similar, both in two-period and in mul-
tiperiod planning horizons.
This paper takes an important step towards under-
standing the transition in the life of the product from
an all-new production to a mixed product line in
which remanufactured and new products coexist. As
this area of research expands, it is important to under-
stand the complete life cycle of the remanufactured
product line. We have yet to learn the impact of
stochastic remanufacturing yield on multiperiod com-
petition. That is the topic of our future research.
An online supplement to this paper is available on
the Management Science website (http://mansci.pubs.
informs.org/ecompanion.html).
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